GREEK PHILOSOPHY - II.
- The Stoics: Zeno, Cleanthes, Chrysippus, and Others
The Stoic school was
founded near the beginning of the third century B.C., by Zeno, a native of Cittium in Cyprus. Having spent twenty years or more in the study of philosophy
with teachers of the Cynic and Megarian shools, and of the Old Academy,—Crates, Stilpo, Diodorus, Xenocrates, Polemo,—he opened a school at Athens, in a
place known as the Painted Porch, ποικίλη Στοά—whence the name of the
school—and gained numerous disciples. He became noted for the simplicity of
his habits of living, the temperateness and terseness of his speech, and the
austerity of his manner, which, however, is said to have "relaxed at a dinner
party". He won great respect from the Athenians, "who gave him the keys of their
walls... honored him with a golden crown and a brazen statue"(1).
In obedience to what he believed a sign
or omen, signifying that he should end his life, he strangled
himself. His successor at the head of the Stoic School was
Cleanthes, a water-carrier, who is described by Diogenes
Laertius as industrious, attentive to the teachings of his
master, and wholly devoted to philosophy, but as not
intellectually strong, and very slow of mind. He did little or
nothing more as a philosopher than to sanction by his influence
the teachings of Zeno, being intellectually incapable of
developing them to any great extent.
He wrote numerous books and a Hymn to
Zeus, which has been called the "most important document of the Stoic
philosophy". The next president of the Stoic school was Chrysippus of the Soli,
or Tarsus, in Cilicia (or Cicilia), who was born about 280 B.C. "He was a man of great
natural ability, and of great acuteness in every way, so that in many points he
dissented from Zeno, and also Cleanthes, to whom he often used to say that he
only wanted to be instructed in the dogmas of the school, and that he would
discover the demonstration for himself(2). He acquired great fame as a
dialectician(3), was vastly industrious, writing five hundred lines a day,
compiling (largely from the poets) more than seven hundred books, and, it is
supposed, expanded portions of the teachings of the earlier Stoics, without,
however, departing very essentially from the doctrines put forth by Zeno. "By Chrysippus the Stoic teaching was brought to completeness; and when he died, in the
year 206 B.C., the form was in every respect fixed in which Stoicism would be
handed down for the next following centuries(4). Other eminent Stoics were Aristo
of Chios, who repudiated all philosophy but ethical philosophy; Herillus of
Carthage, who declared knowledge to be the chief good, and opposed Zeno in some
points; a certain Dionysius, who inclined to the doctrines of the Cyrenaics,
Stoic Conception of the Nature and Parts of Philosophy(5)
It is characteristic
of the Stoic philosophers that, dividing philosophy into logic, physics, and
ethics(6), they laid the chief stress upon ethics, conceiving the real as that which
acts on, or can be acted on by, us. The historical source of this we are to look
for, most probably, in the conditions of the education of philosophers, as well
as the general conditions of the times. The Stoics were, (in other words)
intellectual descendants and representatives of the earlier Cynic schools, with
a large infusion, no doubt, of the dialectico-sceptical spirit of the Megarian
school and the Academy. The general relations between logic, physics, and ethics
they conceived as follows: The chief good is virtue; virtue is "life according
to nature" (a saying of Speusippus and Xenocrates); a true life according to
nature, must depend upon the having a right conception of nature; but a true
conception of nature is reached only in a certain way—by a certain method, and
by the application of a certain standard, or criterion. The science of the good
is ethics; of nature, physics; of methods and the criterion of knowledge, logic.
though ethics is highest, and in one sense, first, it is in another sense last,
presupposing physics, which, in turn, presupposes logic. Zeno and Chrysippus
compared philosophy to an animal; logic being bone and sinews, physics the
flesh, and ethics the soul.
With the Stoics logic is the science not only of thought but of
expression—a corollary of their leading thought (taken in its simplicity) that
the end of man is action, i.e., to be really and externally what he is
virtually and internally. The Stoic logic, therefore, included much that now
falls in the domain of grammar; but it also included what now belongs to formal
logic, and the theory of cognition, in the narrower sense, or theory of the
sources of ideas and the criteria of knowledge. By some of the Stoics, however,
logic was declared to have for its parts,—rhetoric, "the science conversant
about speaking well concerning matters which admit of detailed narrative" and
dialectic, the science of arguing correctly in discussions, which can be carried
on by question and answer [Chrysippus]... a knowledge of what is true and
false, and neither one thing nor the other(7), etc. Dialectic has two parts: one
dealing with ideas, and the other with the expression of ideas.
Origin of Ideas(8)
All ideas, according to the Stoics, originate from sensation,
or the working of the mind upon what is given in sensation. The soul, Zeno held,
is in sensation affected by external objects, as wax is by the seal that is
pressed upon it. Perceptions (φαντασίαι)
are impressions upon or in the soul (τυπώσεις έν
ψυχή). Chrysippus preferred
to say that perceptions, both external and internal, are changes of the soul
(έτερώσεις ψυχής), to regard perception as active rather than passive;
i.e., as a grasping (κατάληψις) of the object instead
of a being impressed by it. Perceptions remaining in the soul after the act of perception become
memories, which taken in their unity, or as a whole, become experience, this in
turn being the basis of judgment, or belief transcending sensation. From
perceptions there arise spontaneously conceptions or general notions which the
Stoics termed "common ideas" (κοιναί
προλήψεις). General notions
may be produced, by a consciously directed act of the mind. As to the special
processes (as distinguished from media or sources) by which ideas are gotten,
the Stoic theory is as follows: "All our thoughts are formed either by direct
perception or by similarity, or analogy, or transposition, or combination, or
opposition. By direct perception we perceive those things which are objects of sense; by similarity those which start from some point present to our senses;
as for instance, we form an idea of Socrates from his likeness. We draw our
conclusions by analogy adopting either an increased idea of the thing as of
Tityus or the Cyclopes; or a diminished idea as of a pigmy. So, too, the idea of
the centre of the world was one derived by analogy from what we
perceived to be the case of the smaller spheres. We use transposition
when we fancy eyes in a man's breast; combination when we take in the
idea of a centaur; opposition when we turn our thoughts to death. Some
ideas arise from comparison,—for instance, from a comparison of words
The Criterion of Truth in Ideas(10)
According to Chrysippus and others the
criterion of knowledge is perception: we know only what we perceive
only those ideas contain certain knowledge for us which are ideas of real
objects. (General notions contain no reference to reality, are merely
subjective.) What ideas these are, can be known with certainty only by the wise
man. But real perceptions, or the ideas of real objects (φαντασίαι
καταληπτωκαί) possess greater distinctness than others, a certain power
to compel belief or assent. That other ideas might also possess such
distinctness and power to compel assent, the Stoics did not deny.
System and Logical Method
The Stoic theory of knowledge and of conceptions
included the idea of a science as a system of ideas. But to only one branch of
systematic method did they give but little attention; viz., deduction, in the
theory of which they made some improvements. They particularly emphasized the
syllogism, the doctrine of which they held to be the most important part of
dialectic, on the ground that it shows what is capable of demonstration, aids in
forming the judgment, and gives scientific character to our knowledge. On the
subject of propositions and argumentation, the Stoics laid down numerous
distinctions, some of which now seem trivial, useless, or irrelevant to what is
known as formal logic(11). They laid particular
stress upon hypothetical and disjunctive syllogisms. It is, however, not quite
correct to say(12) that the Stoics introduced both the hypothetical and the
disjunctive syllogism. The former, or a near approach to it, may be found
explained in Aristotle's Prior Analytics(13).
The categories admitted by the Stoics are (besides the supreme
conception of Being, or, rather, according to the Stoics, Something) four in
number: subject-matter, or substance, τό
condition, τό πώς έχον; relation,
τό πρός τι πώς έχον. Quality seems to
correspond, in general, to Aristotle's "form". Real quality is of two kinds:
common, or general (κοινώς), and peculiar, or special (ίδιώς).
τό πώς έχον are size, motion, color, etc. Right and left, sonship and
fatherhood, are examples of τό πρός τι πώς έχον. The four categories have a
natural interrelation. Substance cannot exist apart from quality, i.e., real
substance is definite. Condition presupposes quality, and relation condition.
Zeller has pointed out three regards in which this theory of categories differs
from Aristotle's(14): the number of the categories(15), their relation to each other,
and their relation to a higher conception. To these may be added a fourth: the
categories of the Stoics are not so purely logical, or conceptual, as the
Aristotelian categories. The Stoic "substance" is, as we shall immediately see,
matter either universal or particular; quality is purely material in origin,
being due to a tension caused by air currents.
Physics, or the Theory of Nature(16)
The physics of the Stoics is also their metaphysics, for, though they could not avoid palpable inconsistencies with fact
in so doing, they held material being to be the whole of being. This idea is in
harmony with their sensational theory of knowledge, apparently a misconception
of the Aristotelian, and, of course, with their ethical doctrine that reality is
that which acts on us or is acted on by us. God, the Soul, the Good, virtue,
vice, emotion, judgments are to the Stoics material, though time, space,
place, expression are admitted to be immaterial. Substance, τό
ύποκείμενον, is either universal matter or the matter of individual
objects. Quality, τό ποιόν, is due to air currents circulating through bodies.
The world has a double nature; matter is capable of acting as well as being acted on; in other words, the world is a duality of matter and
force. Matter, the passive principle, is without any distinctive quality. The
active principle, inherent in the passive, matter, is reason, or God, conceived,
however, as material. By whatever name called,—mind, soul, reason, logos(17) (λόγος), fate, law, nature, providence,—God is the all-pervading fire, the
soul and seminal principle of the world, and is distinct from it only in
abstraction: the distinction between them is a distinction without a
difference. The world is, therefore, a living thing, pervaded by soul,—in different degrees in different parts. It is one, finite, and spherical. Exterior
to it is a boundless (incorporeal) vacuum, there being no vacuum in the world.
The world was produced by God out of his own substance, and will be
absorbed again into that. Immediately afterwards a new world will be created,
and so on in infinitum. In the creation of the world were generated, first, the
four elements, fire, air, water, and earth, which are, all, "essence without any
distinctive quality". "The fire is highest, and that is called
æther; in which first of all the sphere was generated in which the fixed stars are set,
then that in which the planets revolve; after that the air, then the water;
and the sediment, as it were, of all is the earth, which is placed in the centre
of the rest"(18). The water has a spherical form and the same centre as the earth;
so, too, has the air surrounding it. Water and earth constitute the body of
nature, fire and air its soul. The successive worlds that are by the Deity put
forth from, and taken back into, his own substance are in all respects similar.
Throughout all changes law abides. The world is, by virtue of the unity of
matter and force, an organic whole. There is perfect adaptation of means to
ends. Plants have their end in animals, animals in man, the whole, as a whole,
in gods and men. Imperfection and evil are only apparent, attach not to the
whole (which is organically perfect), but to the details of the constitution of
things. The soul of man is material. "Whatever influences the body and is
influenced by it in turn, whatever is united with the body and again separated
from it, must be corporeal. How can the soul be other than corporeal? Whatever
has extension in three dimensions is corporeal, and this is the case with the
soul, since it extends in three dimensions over the whole body. Moreover,
thought and motion are due to animal life. Animal life is matured and kept in
health by the breath
of life. Experience also proves that mental qualities are propagated by
generation, and that they must be consequently connected with a corporeal
substratum"(19). The central seat of the soul is the breast. The parts of the soul
are the five senses, the generative power, the power of speech, and the
intellect. The last-named is the principal part, and is the seat of personal
The emotions, or "passions,"—classified as grief, desire, fear, and
pleasure— were termed by the Stoics "perturbations," and were declared to be
merely judgments. Error in thought is a consequence of these perturbations.
Being a part of the universal soul, the individual human soul is not free in
will, though it is subject to moral responsibility. The soul, though corporeal,
lives after death, but will at the end of the world (cycle) cease to be as an
individual, being dissolved in the universal soul whence it sprung.
Ethics: its Parts(20)
Ethical speculation was extensively practised by the Stoics.
According to Diogenes,—Chrysippus and others, but not Zeno nor Cleanthes,
divided ethics into "the topic of inclination [or natural tendency], the topic of
good and bad, the topic of the passions, the topic of virtue, the topic of the
chief good, and of primary estimation, and of actions: the topic of what things
are becoming, and of exhortation and dissuasion". We shall treat here of the
Chief Good, the Nature of Virtue, the Classes of Virtue, the Classes of Goods,
the Wise Man, and the Stoic attitude towards the Popular Religion.
The Chief Good: Life according to Nature
working as an artist produces in each thing a certain inclination, or tendency,
to preserve a certain form of existence. "The first and dearest object" of every
animal (man included) is the preservation of its own existence and its
consciousness of its own existence. This is its life according to nature; this
is virtue and the chief good,—for virtue and the chief good can be only life
according to nature. But what, precisely, is life according to nature? On this
point there was a difference of opinion among the Stoics. By "nature" must we
understand our human or our universal nature, or both? Zeno, it appears, had
adopted, or, at least, emphasized, merely the first of these three conceptions
of nature; but in the course of the development of Stoicism as a theory the
second and then the last became predominant, the last being held by Chrysippus.
"Chrysippus," says Diogenes(21), "understands that the nature in a manner
corresponding to which we ought to live is both the common nature, and also
human nature in particular, but Cleanthes will not admit of any other than the
common one alone as that to which people ought to live in a manner according;
and repudiates all mention of a particular nature". In the "life according to
nature" is included also, we shall find, life in and according to a social order,
for nature is but a synonym for reason, and society is but a natural off-spring
of reason, the common nature of mankind.
Nature of Virtue
Now a life according to nature is a life determined by
that which takes cognizance of reason in the world, viz., real knowledge.
other words, is knowledge. With the Stoics the distinction made by Aristotle,
and even by Plato, between virtues based on knowledge, on the one hand, and on
the other, natural and acquired virtues, or virtues based on habit "joined with
reason," does not hold. Strictly speaking, the emotions have nothing to do with
virtue: they are, if any thing, mere hindrances to it, "perturbations," from
which the wise or virtuous man is entirely free. Virtue is, rather, a condition
of apathy (άπάθεια). But though virtue is in its origin intellectual, it is in
actuality something more than that: it is action, —action based on knowledge.
The Stoic conception of virtue differs considerably, it thus appears, from the
Socratic conception and the conception held by Plato and Aristotle. The Stoics
differ from Socrates, also, in holding that wrong-doing must be classed among
things voluntary. They assert that vice is the result not of ignorance merely
but of emotional perturbation, and that man has and must exercise control over
the emotions, —generally by suppressing them. There are no degrees in virtue(22)
(but then, at the same time, a distinction is made by the Stoics between an
action that is merely fitting, καθήον, and one that results from a virtuous
disposition, κατόρθωμα); and there is no mean between virtue and vice, a "stick must be either straight or crooked"(23). According to Cleanthes (with whom,
however, Chrysippus disagrees at this point) virtue cannot be lost, "on
account of the firm perceptions which
it plants in men"(24).
Classes of Virtue(25)
Regarding the classification of
the virtues, there was a difference of opinion among the Stoics. One divided
virtues into speculative and practical; another into logical, natural, and
ethical. Some said there were four virtues; others, and among them Cleanthes
and Chrysippus, more than four; one, Allophanes, asserted that there was but
one virtue, viz., prudence. Aristo thought that what was considered a variety of
virtues was more properly a variety of objects with which virtue, in itself one,
was concerned. Chrysippus held that there were distinct conditions of soul
constituting distinct virtues. Those, or at least some of those, who held that
there is a plurality of virtues, held also that some of the virtues are "primitive" and some
"derived"; that the "primitive" virtues are
"prudence, manly courage, justice, and temperance," and that, "subordinate to these
as a kind of species contained in them are magnanimity, continence, endurance,
presence of mind, wisdom in council"(26). That the "virtues reciprocally follow one
another and that he who has one has all"(27) was admitted even by Chrysippus.
Cleanthes, Chrysippus, and other Stoics agreed in thinking that virtue could be
Classes of Goods: the "Summum Bonum"
Virtue, we have seen, was with
the Stoics the chief good, or summum bonum. The Stoics did not admit that, as
Aristotle had held, there was any thing to be added to virtue to constitute
happiness, or the highest good; nor, as they admitted no degrees in virtue, did
they admit degrees in goods: "All goods are equal... every good is to be
desired in the highest degree... and
admits of no relaxation and of no extension"(29). Some things, however, are good in
themselves ("final goods"), and others are good because they lead to final
goods ("efficient goods"), others still are both efficient and final. The
Stoics acknowledged another distinction which may, perhaps, be regarded as a
softening (required by practical necessity) of their rigid rule concerning
goods. All things are good, bad, or indifferent. Things positively bad are the
vices, the diametrical opposites of the virtues: folly, intemperance, cowardice,
injustice. Things indifferent are things that are "neither beneficial nor
injurious, such as life, health, pleasure, beauty, strength, riches, good
reputation, nobility of birth, and their contraries, death, disease, labor,
disgrace, weakness, poverty, and bad reputation, baseness of birth, and the
like"(30). Of things indifferent some, it is evident, are objects of preference
(προηγμένα), because they "concur in producing a well-regulated life," and
others are things to be avoided or rejected (άποπροηγμένα), because they are
of the opposite character. "Every good is expedient, and necessary, and
profitable, and useful, and serviceable, and beautiful, and advantageous, and
eligible, and just: expedient inasmuch as it brings things which by their
happening do us good; necessary inasmuch as it assists us in what we have need
to be assisted; profitable inasmuch as it repays all the care that is expended
on it, and makes a return with interest to our great advantage; useful inasmuch
as it supplies us with what is of utility; serviceable because it does us
service which is much
praised; beautiful because it is accurate in proportion to the need we have of
it and to the service it does; advantageous inasmuch as it is of such a
character as to confer advantage on us; eligible because it is such that we may
rationally choose it; and just because it is in accordance with law, and is an
efficient cause of union" (31).
The " Wise Man"
Now he who is the personal embodiment of virtue—since all
virtue is the same, we need not say here perfect virtue—and who alone
possesses absolute goods, and is worthy to have the advantage of all those "indifferent" things which are objects
of "preference" is the wise man. The wise man
is he who, being perfect in his knowledge of the laws of the universe, above all
passion, and completely governed by reason, is perfectly self-contained and
self-satisfied,—a fit companion for the gods, yes, even for Zeus himself. But
the idea of the perfectly virtuous and self-sufficient individual man was in
part necessarily abandoned by the Stoics. For, in the first place, they were
obliged to admit that in reality there had been, and was, no such man; even the
most exemplary men, Socrates, Diogenes, Antisthenes, had made great
improvement in virtue; and, in the second place, though by their affinity,
historical and logical, with the Cynics they were inclined to regard the
individual as self-sufficient, they were obliged to admit that by the very fact
of his possessing reason the wise man is bound to his fellow-man, that he must
and will have friends, in whom he may see the reflection of himself. They
asserted, indeed, that the wise man was the only person worthy to have friends. Again, the wise man will
marry and beget children (Zeno held that there should be "community" of wives
and children among wise men); he will also, according to Chrysippus, take active
part in affairs of state, for he will desire to restrain vice and excite men to
virtue(32). And yet to realize as fully as possible the conception of individual
independence, the Stoics made the wise man a citizen of the world, not binding
him too closely by ties of family, friendship, or nationality. This idea hit the
mean between the crudeness of Cynicism, pure and simple, and the practice of
ordinary social life in a nation or a state. (The best political constitution is
a mixed one, "combined democracy and kingly power and aristocracy".) Towards the
universe, as a whole, and the power therein, the attitude of the wise man is
that of resignation and obedience. In this attitude he is but acting out his own
true nature. "The virtuous man... will honor God by resigning his will to
the divine will; the divine will he will think better than his own will; he
will remember that in all circumstances we must follow destiny, but that it is
the wise man's prerogative to follow it of his own accord; that there is only
one way to happiness and independence,—that of willing nothing except what is in
the nature of things and will realize itself of our will"(33). But the Stoics
affirmed, on the other hand, that "a wise man will rationally take himself out of
life, either for the sake of his country or of his friends, or if he be in
bitter pain, or under the affliction of mutilation, or incurable disease"(34).
The Stoics and the Popular Religion
The Stoics did not approve of the
ordinary forms and instrumentalities of religion. To them the world was full of
the Deity. Their philosophy was thus a religious, or at least a theological,
philosophy. They gave the names of gods to "fruits, wine, and other gifts" of
the gods, did not forbid the worship of ancient heroes, and on the hypothesis
that God was everywhere accessible, practised the "art of divination" and
prophecy, though there was not perfect unanimity among them in regard to this
last point. They had a peculiar over-fondness for rationalizing the ancient
myths, or giving them plain and consistent meanings(35). To them there was reason
Historical Sources of Stoicism
The chief historical sources of Stoicism have
already been in part indicated. In logic and dialectics the Stoics were
followers of Aristotle and the Cynics. Their neglect of induction is quite in
keeping with their subjective individualistic tendencies generally. In physics
they were followers of Heraclitus, Socrates, and Aristotle; their fire, or logos, or
world-spirit being Hieraclitic, their teleology being Socratic (not
Aristotelian), their "active" and "passive" principles, "matter" and "force" being
quasi-Aristotelian. In ethics they followed Socrates, the Cynics, and the
philosophers of the Old Academy, their leading doctrine, "Follow nature," having
been practiced by the Cynics and enunciated by certain philosophers of the
Academy (Xenocrates, Speusippus, and Polemo). On the whole, the Stoics cannot be
with a large degree of intellectual originality; they were, rather, apostles of
moral force, a certain (limited) ethical individuality.
It remains to examine (briefly) the connection, coherency, and
validity of the leading Stoic conceptions. A distinct breach in the Stoic system
is involved in the fact that whereas reason is held to be universal and
knowable, and sense is held to be the source and criterion of knowledge, it is
denied that there is a rational universal element in sense. Another incoherency,
closely akin to this, is that while sense is held to be the only source of
knowledge, the processes of thought are treated as something essential. An
obvious inconsistency in the Stoic physics is the position that only material
things are real and the admission that certain immaterial things, e.g., time,
space, expression, are real. Of a similar character is the idea that the soul
is corporeal. Here the Stoics are about on a level with the Hylozoists. The
conception of organic unity is given here too simple a form. The unity of body
and soul cannot be that of simple identity or of materialistic organicity (if we
may be allowed such a word); it is a unity in which difference is contained, an
ideal, or speculative, unity. There is, too, an unexplained paradox, to say the
least, in the Stoic idea that, though the individual is merely a part of
universal reason and is subject to necessity, he is morally responsible. In the cardinal ethical doctrine
of the Stoics, Live according to nature, there is, as the development of thought
in the history of the school proves, a certain instability and inconsistency. Is
nature the individual human nature, the universal nature, or a union of the two?
The later Stoics, as we have seen, took the last-mentioned view of the case,
thus solving the conception. The mere individual in himself is practically
nothing and becomes nothing if he be absorbed in the bare universal. Again,
virtue is declared to be the only good, and yet there are admitted to be,
besides things that are positively bad, a class of things that are "indifferent," some of which are "objects of preference," and useful and pleasant
to the wise man; and an act fittingly done is to be distinguished from one done
with right intention. Further, the sphere of the wise man is said to be pure
reason, and yet he is subject to emotion, at least to the extent of having to
repress and suppress it. Moreover the wise man is self-sufficient, but he needs
friends and should take an active part in public affairs, and is dependent upon
and benefited by the possession of external goods. Furthermore, all virtuous men
are absolutely virtuous, all bad men are absolutely bad; but Socrates, Antisthenes, and Diogenes, who are not perfect, are not bad. Finally, the
wise man is a fit companion for Zeus, and yet his attitude towards the
universal order should be that of resignation and submission. In general, the
Stoic system is full of paradox: instead of harmonizing or reconciling the
natural antithesis of sense and reason, the individual and universal, it brought
the members of the antithesis into sharper opposition, and this, too, in spite
of the obvious unity aimed at by the conception of the world as an organic whole
and of the individual as being universally self-sufficient(36).
(1) Diogenes Laertius, Life of Zeno, pp. 259 and following.
(2) Diog. Laert., Life of Chrysippus (Trans. in Bohn's Class Lib.).
(3) "This philosopher used to delight in proposing questions of this sort: The person who reveals the mysteries to the uninitiated commits a sin: the hierophnat reveals them to the uninitiated: therefore the hierophant commits sin... Again, if you say anything, what you say comes out of your mouth; but you say a wagon: therefore a wagon comes out of your
mouth". Diog. Laert.
(4) Zeller's Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics.
(5) Life of Zeno, pp. 274-276.
(6) "Cleanthes says there are six divisions of reason, according to philosophy: dialectics, rhetoric, ethics, poliutics, physics, theology." Diog.
(7) Diog. Laert.
(8) Diog. Laert., Life of Zeno, pp. 277 and following.
(9) Diog. Laert., Life of Zeno. (Trans. p. 278.)
(10) Ibid., p. 276.
(11) Ibid., pp. 282-289.
(12) As Zeller (and Benn after him) says.
(13) See above, p. 125.
(14) See Zeller's Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics, p. 95.
Aristotle's "action" and "passion" are preserved in the Stoic "active" and "passive" principles of the world, i.e., "matter" and "force".
(16) Diog. Laert., Life of Zeno, pp. 307, 318.
(17) An idea common in the latest period of Greek philosophy.
(18) Diog. Laert., Life of Zeno, p. 309.
(19) Zeller's Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics.
(20) Diog. Laert., Life of Zeno, pp. 290-307.
(21) Diog. Laert., Life of Zeno, p. 291. This is a point in which Cleanthes did get beyond Zeno, who apparently stood nearer to the Cynics.
(22) Ueberweg's Hist. of Phil., Vol. I. p. 200.
(23) Diog. Laert., Life of Zeno, p. 305.
(25) Ibid., pp. 292,293.
(26) Diog. Laert., Life of Zeno.
(27) Ibid., p. 304.
(28) Ibid., p. 292.
(29) Diog. Laert., Life of Zeno, p. 292.
(30) Ibid., p. 296.
(31) Diog. Laert., Life of Zeno, p. 295.
(32) Diog. Laert., Life of Zeno, p.303
(33) Zeller's Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics.
(34) Diog. Laert., Life of Zino, p. 306.
(35) See Zeller's Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics.
See below, p. 246.