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VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY

PSYCHOLOGICAL, ETHICAL, METAPHYSICAL
 

WILLIAM FLEMING - 1890 - Table of contents

A - B - C - D - E - F - G - H- I - J - K - L - M - N - O - P - Q - R - S - T - U - V - W  

Diccionario filosófico
Voltaire.
Complete edition

Diccionario de Filosofía
Brief definition of the most important concepts of philosophy.

 

A Dictionary of English Philosophical Terms Francis Garden

 

Vocabulary of Philosophy, Psychological, Ethical, Metaphysical
William Fleming

Biografías y semblanzas Biographical references and lives of philosophers

Brief introduction to the thought of Ortega y Gasset

History of Philosophy Summaries

Historia de la Filosofía
Explanation of the thought of the great philosophers; summaries, exercises...

Historia de la Filosofía
Digital edition of the History of Philosophy by Jaime Balmes

Historia de la Filosofía
Digital edition of the History of Philosophy by Zeferino González

Vidas, opiniones y sentencias de los filósofos más ilustres
Complete digital edition of the work of Diogenes Laertius

Compendio de las vidas de los filósofos antiguos
Fénelon

A brief history of Greek Philosophy
B. C. Burt

 

A Short History of Philosophy

Alexander

 

 

APPETITE

APPETITE.—Physical craving, "accompanied with uneasy sensation" (Reid). Appetites are classified under Desires.

 

"The word appetitus, from which that of appetite is derived, is applied by the Romans and the Latinists to desires in general, whether they primarily relate to the body or not, and with obvious propriety; for the primitive signification is the seeking after whatever may conduce to happiness. Thus Cicero observes, "Motus animorum duplices sunt; alteri, cogitationis; alteri, appetitus. Cogitatio in vero exquirendo maxime versatur; appetitus impellit ad agendum."

"Often means hunger, and sometimes figuratively any strong desire" (Beattie, Moral Science, pt. I. ch. I.).

"Appetites, considered in themselves, are neither social principles of action, nor selfish. They cannot be called social, because they imply no concern for the good of others, nor can they justly be called selfish, though they be commonly referred to that class. An appetite draws us to a certain object, without regard to its being good for us or ill. There is no self-love implied in it, any more than benevolence. We see that, in many cases, appetite will lead a man to what he knows will be to his hurt. To call this, acting from self-love, is to pervert the meaning of words. It is evident that in any case of this kind, self-love is sacrificed to appetite" (Reid, Active Powers, essay III. pt. II. ch. I., Hamilton's ed., p. 553; Stewart, Active Powers, bk. I. ch. I., Hamilton's ed., VI. 127; Cogan, On the Passions, I. 15).

 

 

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