CHOICE.—(1) Voluntary selection from a variety of objects or pursuits; (2) often synonymous with volition. Properly, choice applies to things, volition to forms of action. When used in its primary sense, as applicable to things, the ground of choice may be found not merely in the quality of the things, but in sentiment or association peculiar to the individual.
What is named «deliberate choice,» emphasising the adjective, is more properly an exercise of will in determining personal conduct, implying deliberation so as to ascertain the bearing of a rule of conduct upon action in the circumstances contemplated. Thus Aristotle, treating of προαίρεσις, says:— «Deliberate preference is most intimately connected with Virtue… deliberate preference is joined with law or reason and intelligence (μετὰ λόγου καὶ διανοίας)… We deliberate about those subjects of action which are within our own power» (Ethics, bk. III. ch. II. III.). |
«Choice or preference, in the proper sense, is an act of the understanding; but sometimes it is improperly put for volition, or the determination of the will in things where there is no judgment or preference; thus, a man who owes me a shilling lays down three or four equally good, and bids me take which I choose. I take one without any judgment or belief that there is any ground of preference; this is merely an act of will, that is, a volition» (Correspondence of Dr Reid, p. 79; Taylor’s Synonyms; Tappan’s Appeal to Consciousness, ch. III. secs. 4, 5).— V. WILL.